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Abstract
This note reassesses the basic result in Mukhopadhaya (2003) that, when jurors may acquire
costly signals about a defendant’s guilt, with a larger jury size the probability of reaching a
correct verdict may in fact fall, contrary to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We show that if the
jurors coordinate on any one of a number of (equally plausible) asymmetric equilibria other
than the symmetric equilibrium considered by Mukhopadhaya, the probability of accuracy
reaches a maximum for a particular jury size and remains unchanged with larger juries, thus
mitigating Mukhopadhaya’s result somewhat. However, the case for limiting the jury size – a
recommendation by Mukhopadhaya – gains additional grounds if one shifts the focus from
maximizing the probability of reaching a correct verdict to the maximization of the overall
social surplus, measured by the expected benefits of jury decisions less the expected costs of
acquiring signals.
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In a recent paper, Mukhopadhaya (2003) makes an interesting observation: when jurors
may incur information gathering costs relating to a defendant’s possible guilt, the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem that a larger jury is more likely to reach a correct verdict is not
necessarily true. Because the information gathered by an individual juror is a public
good, the associated free-rider problem may motivate each juror to invest less in informa-
tion gathering costs and result in a lower probability of jury accuracy when there are more
jurors involved. This argument prompts Mukhopadhaya to counter a recent argument by
the judges in the United States that 6-person juries are inferior to 12-person juries.
Underlying Mukhopadhaya’s analysis, three assumptions are particularly noteworthy:
(1) the optimal jury size should maximize the probability of an accurate verdict; (2) each
juror’s payoﬀ when no juror pays any attention is φ(0) = 0; and (3) the jurors play a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in a binary-decision, information gathering game –
pay attention or don’t pay attention.
The ﬁrst assumption, motivated by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, turns out to be
equivalent to the maximization of expected beneﬁts of accurate verdicts less expected costs
of inaccurate verdicts (type I and type II errors), given Mukhopadhaya’s assumption that
the accurate verdicts yield payoﬀs equal to 1 and inaccurate verdicts yield zero payoﬀs.
But if such welfaristic interpretation is to be imposed, the implicit social objective in
Mukhopadhaya would still be incomplete as it ignores the jurors’ information gathering
costs. Since information gathering costs are likely to vary with jury size, a priori it is
not clear that the jury size that maximizes the probability of an accurate verdict would
necessarily maximize the expected social welfare of verdict decisions (net of the information
gathering costs). Similarly, it is not clear how social welfare would change with the increase
in jury size. We address these issues.
Mukhopadhaya justiﬁes the second assumption by claiming that a positive valued
φ(0) “would bias results toward more free riding, but would not qualitatively change the
ﬁndings” (see page 30 of Mukhopadhaya’s article).1 This claim is not straightforward:
while the Mukhopadhaya-noted increased free riding tendency is deﬁnitely true for any
1φ(0) can be positive if the defendant is declared guilty with probability 1/2, when the number of signals
indicating guilt equals the number of signals indicating innocence.
1given number of jurors, hence each juror pays attention with a lower probability for both
small and large juries, whether this necessarily implies relatively greater reduction (due to
positive φ(0)) in the probability of reaching a correct verdict for larger juries is unclear;
thus, the implication of such an assumption for the optimal jury size question should be
properly examined.
The argument in favor of symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is standard. However,
ruling out possible asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria, where some jurors play mixed
strategies and others play pure strategies (i.e., pay no attention), would have been more
acceptable if one can show that the symmetric equilibrium would Pareto dominate the
asymmetric equilibria. We examine this possibility.
Our results are as follows. We start by showing that asymmetric mixed strategy equi-
libria exist, and the best such equilibrium (in terms of the probability of reaching a correct
verdict) for any given jury size is equivalent to a symmetric equilibrium corresponding to
a smaller jury. Thus, by varying the jury size and comparing across the best asymmetric
equilibria, we ﬁnd that the probability of reaching a correct verdict is maximized for a par-
ticular jury size and this probability will remain unchanged with further increases in jury
size. Thus, Mukhopadhaya’s main result about larger juries strictly lowering the probabil-
ity of accuracy is somewhat mitigated if one focuses on the best asymmetric equilibrium.2
Importantly, the asymmetric equilibria neither Pareto dominate, nor are Pareto domi-
nated by, the symmetric equilibrium of Mukhopadhaya. Thus, our asymmetric equilibria
are no less compelling as a plausible description of equilibrium.
Next, focusing exclusively on the symmetric equilibrium we show two things: (i)
with the probability of reaching a correct verdict as the primary social objective (as in
Mukhopadhaya), a more plausible assumption of φ(0) = 1
2 would add to Mukhopadhaya’s
argument that the jury size should be restricted; (ii) a broader social objective by consid-
ering the information gathering costs would also strengthen Mukhopadhaya’s suggestion
about the jury size restriction. While both points (i) and (ii) accentuate the basic ﬁnd-
ings of Mukhopadhaya, it will be shown that arriving at our second conclusion (point
(ii)) is not intuitively that obvious, especially for φ(0) = 1
2. Thus, while Mukhopadhaya’s
assumption that φ(0) = 0 turns out not to matter in the core recommendation of jury
2This remains true whether φ(0) = 0 (Mukhopadhaya’s assumption) or φ(0) positive.
2size restriction, to fully understand the underlying economic reasons it would be better to
assume φ(0) = 1
2 instead.
The next section presents the model. In section 3, we take another look at the sym-
metric mixed strategy equilibrium of Mukhopadhaya. In section 4, we analyze asymmetric
mixed strategy equilibria and compare with the symmetric equilibrium. Section 5 consid-
ers the issue of social eﬃciency, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the model of jury trial as in Mukhopadhaya (2003), with n risk-neutral jurors.
The state of the world is that the defendant is either guilty or nor guilty, {G,NG}.
The outcome of the trial is that the defendant is liable or not liable, {L,NL}.T h e
uncertainty about the true state is denoted by a common prior probability p = 1
2 that
the true state is NG. Each juror’s payoﬀs over outcomes and states, the same as the
society’s (or the mechanism designer’s) payoﬀs, are U(L,G)=U(NL,NG) = 1 and
U(L,NG)=U(NL,G)=0 .
During the trial a juror who pays attention receives a private signal S0 or S1 about
the true state of the world where Pr[S1|G]=Pr[S0|NG]=q ∈ (1
2,1] is the precision
of a signal. There is a ﬁxed cost c ∈ (0,1) of paying attention. The jurors choose an
alternative by majority voting.3 In the case of a tie, the decision to convict or acquit
is chosen with probability 1/2. With these assumptions sincere and informative voting
(i.e., expected utility maximizing voting in accordance with the signal received) is rational
(Austin-Smith and Banks, 1996). Jurors who do not pay attention simply abstain from
voting and the majority voting rule applies to the actual votes cast.4
During the trial a juror who pays attention receives a private signal S0 or S1 about
the true state of the world where Pr[S1|G]=Pr[S0|NG]=q ∈ (1
2,1] is the precision
of a signal. There is a ﬁxed cost c ∈ (0,1) of paying attention. The jurors choose an
3We are not interested in the question of optimal voting rule; see Persico (2004) for such an analysis.
4Abstention as an option in this note diﬀers from Mukhopadhaya’s assumption that the uninformed
jurors can simply follow the majority voting of informed jurors. Since Mukhopadhaya does not specify the
voting rule to be sequential, it is not clear how uninformed jurors can observe informed jurors’ votes. Even
with sequential voting, the observability problem remains unless one also assumes that all uninformed
jurors will vote only after the informed jurors have voted.
3alternative based on the majority of realized signals, declaring the defendant liable if the
majority receives signal S1 and not liable if the majority receives S0; in the event of a tie,
the decision to convict or acquit is chosen with probability 1/2.
We will consider two alternative objectives to assess the question of optimal jury size:
(1) maximization of the probability of an accurate verdict; (2) maximization of the overall
social welfare measured by the expected beneﬁts of jury decisions less the expected costs
of acquiring signals. Mukhopadhaya focused exclusively on the ﬁrst objective.
3 Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium





qm(1 − q)k−m (1)
denote the binomial probability that out of k independent signals m ≤ k are correct,
given the precision of the signal. Then the probability of a n-person jury reaching a













b(k/2;k,q), if k is even (2)
where [x] denotes the greatest integer less than x.
Note that (2) applies to k ≥ 1. When no jurors pay attention and receive no signals
Mukhopadhaya assumes that the payoﬀ is zero; i.e., φ(0) = 0. An alternative assumption
is that they vote according to their prior of 1
2 so that φ(0) = 1
2. Note that b(0;0,q)=
0!
0!0!q0(1 − q)0 = 1 so that with this assumption (2) still applies with k = 0, treating zero
as even.
Let
B(k,q)=φ(k) − φ(k − 1) (3)
be the beneﬁt to the kth juror from paying attention when exactly k − 1 other jurors
pay attention gross the cost of paying attention. Then an extremely useful result for the







2)b((k − 1)/2;(k − 1),q),
if k is even;
if k is odd.
(4)
If we assume φ(0) = 0 as in Mukhopadhaya then (4) does not hold for k = 1 and
B(1,q) = 1. However if we assume φ(0) = 1
2, then (4) holds for k = 1 as well. In what
follows we will pursue the consequences of both assumptions regarding φ(0).
The net beneﬁt to a juror of paying attention when every other juror pays a mixed









b(k − 1;n − 1,σ)B(k,q) − c if n is odd;
n−1  
k=1,3,...
b(k − 1;n − 1,σ)B(k,q) − c if n is even. (5)
If we assume φ(0) = 1
2 then Π can be written as
Π(n,σ;c,q)=( q − 1
2)
[n−1
2 ]  
m=0
(n − 1)!(σq)m(σ(1 − q))m(1 − σ)(n−1−2m)
(m!)2(n − 1 − 2m)!
− c. (6)
If we follow Mukhopadhaya in assuming that φ(0) = 0 then we need to add an extra term
(1−σ)n−1
2 to the net beneﬁt in (6).
The symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium σ∗(n;c,q) is derived by solving
Π(n,σ;c,q)=0 , (7)





Note that if φ(0)  = 0, then the summation must include a j = 0 term, unlike the case
considered in Mukhopadhaya.
Figures 1 and 2 show numerical results for σ∗ and Φ using MATLAB.5 Mukhopadhaya
reports results for parameter values c =0 .1 and q =0 .65,q =0 .7 and q =0 .95. We
5All MATLAB ﬁles can be made available on request.
5can reproduce his results but in this note we conﬁne ourselves to one intermediate value,
q =0 .75. Furthermore, we compare results assuming φ(0) = 0, with our alternative
assumption φ(0) = 1
2. Clearly the assumption that φ(0) = 0 is not innocuous as it heavily
penalizes no attention by all jurors and so biases the mixed equilibrium towards paying
attention. The result is that whereas with φ(0) = 0 jury accuracy is maximized at a jury
size n =3 ,w i t hφ(0) = 1
2 accuracy increases monotonically as n decreases from n =1 2
to n = 1. Using jury accuracy as the measure of social beneﬁt then sees our alterative
assumption regarding φ(0) further undermine the Condorcet Jury Theorem. As we will
see in a latter section, it is undermined still further when we rank diﬀerent jury sizes using
social welfare as our measure.
4 Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
We now explore asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where k out of n jurors play the
symmetric mixed-strategy σ∗(k : c,q) and the remaining jurors pay no attention with





and the net payoﬀ for each attentive juror is Φ − c and for each non-attentive juror Φ.
The condition for this to be an equilibrium is that, the net payoﬀ when the (k+1)th juror







b(j;k,σ∗(k;c,q))φ(j +1 )− c. (10)
(10) says that the probability of a correct decision when only k jurors pay attention with
probability σ∗ must exceed the increased probability when one more juror pays attention







b(j;k,σ∗(k;c,q))φ(j) <c . (11)
Figure 3 shows that this condition is satisﬁed for the same parameter values as before
and for both assumptions regarding φ(0). We have therefore shown that alongside the
symmetric equilibrium (SE), there exist asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria (AE) for
6which k =2 ,3,... out of n jurors play a mixed strategy with probability σ∗(k;c,q)o f
paying attention at a ﬁxed c, and the remaining n − k pay no attention with probability
1 and zero cost. Now in an AE, the overall probability of accuracy stops being increasing
in jury size as more inattentive jurors are added. Put diﬀerently, if one were to focus
on the best asymmetric equilibrium (best in terms of the overall probability of accuracy)
corresponding to each jury size, then the probability of accuracy will be maximized for a
particular jury size and will remain stationary for any further jury additions.
Next we turn to a particular equilibrium selection test, that of Pareto ranking, to see
if any of the equilibria, SE and AE, is more plausible. For the following analysis, ﬁx the
jury size n.
First note that, for the ﬁxed jury size n there are n possible equilibria to choose from,
one symmetric equilibrium and n−1 asymmetric equilibria with k =1 ,2,...n−1 attentive
jurors. An AE with 1 <k≤ n−1 attentive jurors, AE(k) say, is essentially equivalent to
a SE with jury size k, SE(k) say. The probability of accuracy and the costs incurred by
the jurors are identical in AE(k) and SE(k). Thus ﬁgures 1 and 2 for SE(n) also apply
to asymmetric equilibria as well.
Now consider the two groups of jurors, non-attentive and attentive. For the former
they incur no attention costs and so prefer equilibria that maximize the probability of
accuracy, Φ. From ﬁgure 2 this occurs when 3 jurors pay attention if φ(0) = 0 and when
1 juror pays attention if φ(0) = 1
2. Now consider the attentive jurors. Figure 4 plots their
expected utility as the size of the group k increases. Two opposite eﬀects are at work
here: as k increases, the probability of accuracy ﬁrst rises and then falls monotonically
with k for the case φ(0) = 0 as we have seen in ﬁgure 2 (since the SE(k) is equivalent to
AE(k)), and falls monotonically for the case φ(0) = 1
2. However, this eﬀect that reduces
the expected utility of an attentive juror is more than cancelled out by a reduction in his
attention costs owing to the free-rider eﬀect. The net result is that the expected utility
of an attentive juror rises as k increases reaching a maximum at k = n, the symmetric
equilibrium. We conclude from this that we cannot establish Pareto dominance of any of
the multiple equilibria.
75S o c i a l W e l f a r e
We now return to the symmetric equilibrium and examine the question of social welfare
maximization. Figure 5 plots the expected social cost of a symmetric equilibrium with
n jurors deﬁned as C = nσ∗c.F o r φ(0) = 0, as jury size decreases the expected social
costs fall and as we have seen the expected accuracy of the jury rises. This provides a
further argument for limiting the size of a jury. However the same ﬁgure shows that this
result is sensitive to the assumption regarding φ(0). If we assume that φ(0) = 1
2 then
the improvement in accuracy of the jury comes at an increasing social cost as jury size
decreases from n =1 2t on = 3, but a further decrease in size sees social costs falling as
before.
Figure 6 assesses the net beneﬁt of reducing jury size by plotting the expected social
surplus Φ − C against jury size. Whereas for φ(0) = 0 the probability of accuracy is
maximized at n = 3, social surplus is maximized at n = 1. Social eﬃciency considerations
therefore adds weight to the case for a smaller jury.
With our alternative assumption φ(0) = 1
2 we arrive at the same qualitative conclusion,
though social surplus rises by less as jury size decreases. Thus for both assumptions and
for this numerical example social surplus rises monotonically as n decreases and suggests
that, owing to the free-rider problem, any jury may yield less beneﬁt than a decision
arrived by a single judge or magistrate.
6 Conclusions
We have investigated whether the results in Mukhopadhaya are strengthened or weakened
by the assumption regarding the payoﬀ φ(0) when no jurors pay attention. In Mukhopad-
haya φ(0) = 0 is assumed, and our ﬁrst numerical result is that whereas with φ(0) = 0
jury accuracy is maximized at a jury size n =3 ,w i t hφ(0) = 1
2 accuracy increases mono-
tonically as n decreases from n =1 2t on = 1. Using jury accuracy as the measure of
social beneﬁt then sees our alterative assumption regarding φ(0) strengthen the result of
Mukhopadhaya.
Our second numerical result is that using social surplus as the criterion for comparing
diﬀerent jury sizes further strengthens his result in that with both assumptions regarding
8φ(0), social surplus is maximized at a jury size n =1 .
Finally, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibria for which the probability of
a jury making correct decisions does not decline with jury-size. None of the n possible
equilibria (one symmetric and n − 1 asymmetric) can be Pareto-ranked. To rule out
asymmetric equilibria would therefore be ad hoc and this mitigates the case for restricting
the jury size somewhat. Of course one ﬁnal and obvious reason to limit the jury size, in
addition to the free-rider problem and social welfare considerations, that would work for
both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria is, if there is some ﬁxed cost of summoning
a juror irrespective of whether the particular juror pays attention or not to the judicial
proceedings.
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Figure 1: Symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, σ∗,a sn increases. q =
0.75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.







































Figure 2: Probability of jury arriving at a correct decision, Φ,a sn ≥ 2 increases.
q =0 .75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.



















∆Φ   (φ(0)=1/2)
∆Φ   (φ(0)=0)
Figure 3: Condition for an asymmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with k
out of n jurors playing σ∗, and the remaining n-k paying no attention, as k ≥ 1
increases. q =0 .75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.


















































Figure 4: Expected utility of attentive jurors in an asymmetric equilibrium with
k out of n jurors playing σ∗, and the remaining n-k paying no attention, as
k ≥ 1 increases. q =0 .75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.




















Figure 5: Expected social cost for symmetric equilibria as n ≥ 1 increases.
q =0 .75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.































Figure 6: Beneﬁt-cost measure for symmetric equilibria as n ≥ 1 increases.
q =0 .75, c =0 .1. φ(0) = 0 compared with φ(0) = 1
2.
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